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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. 910533

v.
WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON,

Category No. 3

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the district court's order denying
petitioner habeas corpus relief in a case involving a conviction
of first degree murder1, a capital felony.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the
district court correctly denied petitioner habeas corpus relief
based on its determination that petitioner entered his guilty
plea knowingly and voluntarily and that the trial court complied
with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting the
plea.
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, '[the
appellate court] survey[s] the record in the light most favorable
to the findings and judgment; and [the court] will not reverse if
1

First degree murder is now called aggravated murder.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1991).

See

there is any reasonable basis therein to support the trial
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be
granted.'"

Medina v. Cook. 779 P. 2d 658 (Utah 1989) (quoting

Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)).
reviews the "record as a whole."

The appellate court

State v. Maquire, 184 Utah Adv.

Rep. 39, 40 n.l (Utah April 10, 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,2 alleging that
his guilty plea to a charge of first degree murder was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered and that the trial court failed
to comply strictly with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in accepting the plea (R. la-3).

The district court

denied petitioner habeas corpus relief based on its determination
that petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and
that the trial court complied with rule 11 in accepting the plea
(R. 41-44).

2

Petitioner filed his petition on June 18, 1991 under
former rule 65B (R. la-3). The current version of rule 65B
became effective on September 1, 1991. Although the district
court signed its ruling denying the petition on November 7, 1991,
it applied the former rule (R. 41).
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its written order, the district court made the
following pertinent findings of fact:

2. [T]he petition[er] entered a plea of
guilty to the offense charged [first degree
murder] on September 7, 1989.
3. [T]he plea of guilty entered by the
petitioner was pursuant to a plea negotiation
and . . . a statement of petitioner was
prepared by defense counsel and was executed
by petitioner at the time the plea of guilty
was entered.
4. [T]he evidence shows that prior to the
entry of the plea of guilty defense counsel
reviewed the written statement with
petitioner, Salazar; . . . the elements and
facts of the crime were explained to Salazar;
[and] the constitutional rights of Salazar
were contained in said statement and
explained to Salazar as were the negotiations
of the parties for the plea entered.
5. The evidence further shows that a dialog
[sic] was conducted between the Court and
Salazar at the time the plea of guilty was
entered by which the Court reviewed the
contents of the written statement including
the rights of Salazar, the crime charged, the
possible punishments and the plea
negotiation.
6. [T]he plea statement set forth the crime
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First
Degree[,] and . . . Salazar knew the crime
charged, the elements and basis thereof and
the possible penalty that could be imposed by
the Court.
7. Salazar was aware of and knew that the
plea negotiations included the fact that the
State of Utah would not present evidence nor
request imposition of the death penalty in
exchange for the guilty plea of Salazar.
8.

[T]he facts presented herein establishes
3

[sic] that the Court complied with the
requirements of Rule 11[,] Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and that the record was
sufficient to establish that Salazar was
fully advised by his counsel and by the
Court•
(R. 42-43) (a copy of the court's ruling is contained in Appendix
A)SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner fails to demonstrate that there is no
reasonable basis for the district court's refusal to grant him
habeas corpus relief.

Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989).

In determining that the trial court had complied with rule 11 in
taking the plea and that the plea was knowing and voluntary, the
district court correctly referred to petitioner's written plea
statement, signed and received at the time of his plea, in which
petitioner acknowledged that he understood the elements and facts
of the crime charged, the minimum and maximum sentence for that
crime, and the nature of the plea bargain.
Therefore, the district court's ruling should be
affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE IS
NO REASONABLE BASIS TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, '[the
appellate court] survey[s] the record in the light most favorable
to the findings and judgment; and [the court] will not reverse if
4

there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's
refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"
Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989) (quoting Bundv v.
DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988)).

Without referring to this

standard of review, petitioner asks this Court to reverse the
district court's denial of his habeas petition.

Because

petitioner fails to show that there is no reasonable basis for
the district court's ruling, this Court should affirm.
Petitioner argues that the district court should have
granted his petition because it had not strictly complied with
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in taking his guilty
plea, thus resulting in a plea that was not knowing and
voluntary.3

He alleges the trial court failed to conduct an

adequate colloquy with him in three areas:

(1) the elements and

facts of the crime charged; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence
for that crime; and (3) the nature of the plea bargain.

Although

it is not entirely clear from his brief, petitioner appears to
assume correctly that, in a habeas proceeding under former rule
65B(i), he had to show a constitutional violation (as opposed to
a mere violation of rule 11) in the plea process.

See Utah R.

Civ. P. 65B(i)(l); Andrews v. Morris, 677 P.2d 80, 85 (Utah 1983)
(accepting without qualification the state's position that only
claims of a substantial denial of state or federal constitutional
rights may be adjudicated in a rule 65B(i) proceeding).

3

In

The same court that took petitioner's plea considered his
habeas petition.
5

short, he had to show that his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered.

See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-

13 (Utah 1987) .
Reviewing the record as a whole, State v. Maquire, 184
Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 40 n.l (Utah April 10, 1992), there is a
reasonable basis for the district court's denial of the habeas
petition.

When the court took petitioner's plea, it asked him

whether he had read and understood the "Defendant's Statement"
(hereafter "affidavit" —

a copy of which is contained in

Appendix B) he was to sign; petitioner responded that he had read
it and understood it (R. 22). Maquire makes clear that a written
affidavit which "was read, understood, and acknowledged by
defendant and the court" is properly part of "the record" for
purposes of determining rule 11 compliance and whether the plea
was knowing and voluntary.
A.

Maquire, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

Elements and Facts of the Crime

With respect to the elements and facts of the crime
charged, the following exchange between the court and petitioner
occurred:
[The Court]: Now, the State is required to
prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Have you and your counsel discussed that
fact?
[Petitioner]:

Yes, Your Honor.

[The Court]: Has counsel explained to you
the elements of the crimes involved here, and
the proof necessary, that the State must
produce to prove a charge against you under
those elements?
[Petitioner]:

Yes, Your Honor.
6

[The Court]: All right. Mr. Bradshaw
[petitioner's counsel], have you gone over
with Mr. Salazar, thoroughly, the elements
involved in both these, in particular, in the
Count I Criminal Homicide Murder in the First
Degree charge?
Mr. Bradshaw: Yes, Your Honor; both Ms.
Palacios and I have reviewed with Mr. Salazar
what the elements the State would be required
to prove — the degree of proof they would
have to meet. It's my belief that Mr.
Salazar understands those.
The Court:
Palacios?

That also your belief, Mrs.

Ms. Palacios:

Yes, Your Honor, it is.

The Court: Mr. Salazar, you agree with that?
[Petitioner]:
(R. 22-23).

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

The affidavit contained the following language

concerning the elements and facts for first degree murder:
I have received a copy of the Information
against me, I have read it, and I understand
the nature and elements of the offense for
which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime of which I am
charged is [sic] as follows: Defendant
intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of Charlotte Montoya under the following
circumstance: the defendant has previously
been convicted of a Second Degree Felony
involving use or threat of violence to a
person.
My conduct, and the conduct of other
persons for which I am criminally liable,
that constitutes the elements of the crime
charged is as follows: On or about March 28,
1988, Ben F. Salazar choked Charlotte Montoya
and caused knowingly or intentionally her
death.
(R. 13-14).

Although the affidavit's recitation of the elements

and the facts could have been better, it satisfies the
7

requirement of Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313, that the affidavit
"contain both a statement of the elements of the offenses and a
synopsis of the defendant's acts that establish the elements of
the crimes charged."
Therefore, there is a reasonable basis in the record
for the district court's rejection of petitioner's claim that he
was not adequately informed of and did not understand the
elements and facts of the crime.
B.

Minimum and Maximum Sentence

The affidavit contains the following statement
concerning the minimum and maximum sentence for first degree
murder:
I know that the maximum possible sentence
may be imposed upon my plea of guilty, and
that sentence may be for life or death. I
also know that I may be ordered by the court
to make restitution to any victim or victims
of my crimes.
(R. 15). During the plea colloquy, the following exchange
occurred:
The Court: Well, have your attorneys gone
over with you[] the possible penalties that
can be imposed by the Court for the crime of
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First
Degree?
[Petitioner]:

Yes, Your Honor.

(R. 26). Again, although the affidavit could have stated it more
clearly, it adequately advised petitioner of the minimum sentence
(life) and maximum sentence (death) for first degree murder. See
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 ("affidavit should clearly state the
allowable punishment for the crimes charged"); Utah Code Ann. §
8

76-3-207 (1990) (amended 1991, 1992).
Therefore, the district court had a reasonable basis
for rejecting petitioner's claim that he was not adequately
informed and did not understand the minimum and maximum sentence
for the crime charged.
C.

Knowledge of Plea Bargain

The affidavit states that "[t]he State agrees to submit
no evidence in aggravation at the penalty phase. . . . My plea of
guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney.

The promises, duties and provisions of

this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea
Agreement within this affidavit" (R. 13, 16). Regarding
petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement the following
exchange occurred at the time of his plea:
[The Prosecutor]: [0]n the statement that
[petitioner] is signing, says [sic] [:] "The
State agrees to submit n: evidence of
aggravation [at] the penalty phase." We do
not intend to offer evidence on the question
of life versus death. We made it clear,
we're not pursuing the Death Penalty; but if
there is a question on what he should be
sentenced to, we certainly want an
opportunity to be heard, and I think some of
the aggravating factors in this case would be
relevant to the Court in trying to impose a
sentence.
[Defense Counsel]:
that —

That was our intent is

[The Prosecutor]:

The way this was worded.

[Defense Counsel]: —what Ben understands
is, that the State is not seeking the Death
Penalty, although they do intend to submit
the transcript as they did and argue that.
Do you understand that, Ben?
9

[Petitioner]:

Yeah.

[The Prosecutor]: We intend to argue in the
penalty phase he should spend the rest of his
life in prison and I think some of the
evidence from the Preliminary Hearing
Transcript, together with some other matters,
should be submitted to the Court.
[The Court]: I understand.
under[stand] that?

Does the Defense

[Petitioner]: Well, if they're goin' to go
for that, I'll just go for the Death Penalty.
I'm not goin' to spend the rest of my life in
prison. Not from the experience I had with
the jailers, and the Halfway Houses, and
stuff like that.
[Defense Counsel]:
Your Honor?
[The Court]:

Could I have a moment,

Certainly.

(WHEREUPON an off the record conference was
held at side-bar between the attorney's [sic]
and their client)
[Defense Counsel]: Ben, at this point,
having heard that the State intends to
introduce evidence and argue for Life
Imprisonment, while not arguing for the Death
Penalty[,] do you still wish to go ahead with
the Plea Negotiations as we have done thus
far?
[Petitioner]: Yes.
(R. 29-31).

Based upon the foregoing, the district court

reasonably found that petitioner "was aware of and knew that the
plea negotiations included the fact that the State of Utah would
not present evidence nor request imposition of the death penalty
in exchange for [petitioner's] guilty plea" (R. 42). See
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (the details of any plea bargain should
be set forth in the affidavit).
10

In sum, petitioner fails to show that there is no
reasonable basis to support the district court's denial of his
habeas petition on the ground that the court complied with rule
11 and that petitioner knowingly entered his plea.

Accordingly,

viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to
the findings and judgment of the district court, Maauire, 184
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40 n.l; Medina, 779 P.2d at 658, this Court
should affirm the denial of the petition.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas
petition.

ZL^—
RESPECTFULLY submitted this //^tlay of May, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
V
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was hand-delivered to Joseph C.
Fratto, Jr., Attorney for Petitioner, 431 South 300 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, this /f^ay

of May, 1992.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BEN FIDEL SALAZAR,
Petitioner,

)
)

-vsWARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS

}

'

Respondent.

Case No. 910903891HC
Hon. Richard H. Moffat

)

The above matter come on for hearing before the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat on September 17 and 18,1991 upon the petition of Ben Fidel Salazar for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner appeared in person and by Joseph C.

Fratto, Jr. his attorney. Respondent was represented by Walter R. Ellett, Chief
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney - Justice Division. The Court dismissed the
petitioners motion to withdraw his plea of guilty in the underlying criminal matter
and having determined that this Habeas Corpus petition could be heard pursuant
to Rule 65 (b)(i) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure and the Court having received
evidence and having heard arguments of counsel and considers the legal
authorities cited by counsel and being fully advised in the premises does now
enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The petitioner is presently in the custody of the Warden, Utah State
Prison, having been sentenced by this Court to a term of life in prison as
.?. ; ; d ' ]

provided by law for the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a
Capitol Offense, said sentence having been made on October 12, 1989.
2. That the petition entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged on
September 7,1989.
3. That the plea of guilty entered by the petitioner was pursuant to a plea
negotiation and that a statement of petitioner was prepared by petitioner's
defense counsel and was executed by petitioner at the time the plea of guilty
was entered.
4. That the evidence shows that prior to the entry of the plea of guilty
defense counsel reviewed the written statement with the petitioner, Salazar; that
the elements and facts of the crime were explained to Salazar; that the
constitutional rights of Salazar were contained in said statement and explained
to Salazar.

Further that the penalty for the crime charged was explained to

Salazar as were the negotiations of the parties for the plea entered.
5. The evidence further shows that a dialog was conducted between the
Court and Salazar at the time the plea of guilty was entered by which the Court
reviewed the contents of the written statement including the rights of Salazar, the
crime charged, the possible punishments and the plea negotiation.
6.

That the plea statement set forth the crime of Criminal Homicide,

Murder in the First Degree and that Salazar knew the crime charged, the
elements and basis thereof and the possible penalty that could be imposed by
the Court.
7.

That Salazar was aware of and knew that the plea negotiations

included the fact that the State of Utah would not present evidence nor request
imposition of the death penalty in exchange for the guilty plea of Salazar.
8. That the facts presented herein establishes that the Court complied
with the requirements of Rule 11 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the

record was sufficient to establish that Salazar was fully advised by his counsel
and by the Court.
9. That the services of defense counsel for and on behalf of the petitioner
Salazar was effective and appropriate and that Salazar was represented and
assisted In a manner consistent with constitutional guarantees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That this Court has jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the petition for
habeas corpus herein.
2.

That the petitioner Salazar was afforded efficient and effective

~~: stance of counsel in all stages of the proceedings in the criminal matter
before this court.
3.

That the plea of guilty entered by Salazar was a voluntary and

intelligent choice by Salazar and that the same was entered knowingly and
voluntanlv t
-'

Salazar.

~ nat Salazar entered his plea of guilty after having been advised of the

constitutional rights he would give up, the nature of the crime to which he was
entered his plea of guilty, the possible penalties that could be imposed, the
penalty that had been recommended by the prosecution, and after a
determination by the Court as to the absence of any inducements to influence
Salazar's plea; and that the Court complied with the requirements of Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5. That the petition of the petitioner Salazar for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
should be denied.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the
Court enters the following Order.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

- wG43

Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus was
delivered to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Attorney for Petitioner Ben Fidel Salazar at
431 South 300 East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the

day of

October, 1991.
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APPENDIX B

Third Juuicia! D;s:r;ct

SEP " 7 1989
KECC'UNTM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D^^*^i/\SgjQ^0
STATE OP UTAH
THE STATE OF OTAH,
Plaintiff

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

v.
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR,

Criminal No. 881991356FS

Defendant.

COME NOW, BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, the defendant in this case and
hereby acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime:
CRIME
A.

Criminal Homicide

DEGREE
Capital Offense

PUNISHMENT (Min/Max)
Life or Death

Murder in the First
Degree

The State agrees to submit no evidence in aggravation at the
penalty phase.

I have received a copy of the Information against me, I
have read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the
offense for which I am pleading guilty.

O.G13

The elements of the crime of which I am charged is as
follows:

Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of

Charlotte Montoya under the following circumstance: the defendant
has previously been convicted of a* Second Degree Felony involving
use or threat of violence to a person.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime
charged is as follows:

On or about March 28, 1988, Ben F. Salazar

choked Charlotte Montoya and caused knowingly or intentionally her
death.
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and
understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me*
2.

I have not waived my right to counsel,

3.

If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this

statement and understand the nature and elements of the charge, my
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my plea
of guilty.
4.

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney

is FRANCES M. PALACIOS and JAMES C. BRADSHAW and I have had an
opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the
consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney,
5.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.

- 2

-
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6.

I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right

to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them
cross-examined by my attorney.

I also know that I have the right to

have my witnesses .subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court
upon my behalf.
7.

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf

but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn
against me if I do not testify.
8.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me

I need only plead "not guilty11 and the matter will be set for trial,
at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the trial is

before a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
9.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I

were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have
the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah and that if
I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs
would be paid by the State.
10.

I know that the maximum possible sentence may be

imposed upon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for life or
death.

I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make

restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes.

- 3
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11.
periods,

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive

if my plea is to more than one charge.

I also know that

if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing on another
offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded
guilty, tiy plea in the present action may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed upon me.
12.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am

waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the
preceding paragraphs.
13.

My plea of guilty is the result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney.

The promises, duties

and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in
the Plea Agreement within this affidavit#

14.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the
judge.

I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what

they believe that court may do are also not binding on the court.
15.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any

kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises
except, those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement,
have been made to me.

• 4
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16.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me

by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

I know that I am

free to change or delete anything contained in this affidavit.

I do

not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are
correct*
17.

I am satisfied with the advise and assistance of my

attorneys.
18.
the

o

I am 50 years of age; I have attended school through

gradeAand I can read and understand the English language.

I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made. I am not
presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or
intoxicants.
19.

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind,

mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
DATED this

f ^ day of September, 1989.

BEN FIDEL S ALA Z ART
Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, the
defendant above, and that we know he has read the statement or
- 5 -

that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is
mentally and physically competent.

To the best of my knowledge and

belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are
correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

Aa^,
FRANCES M. PALA€IOS
Attorney for? Defendant

J^MES C. BRADSHAW
ttorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, defendant.

I have reviewed this

statement of the defendant and find that the declarations, including
the elements of the offense of the charges and the factual synopsis
of the defendants criminal conduct which constitutes the offense
are true and correct.

No improper inducements, threats or coercion

to encourage a plea have been offered defendant.

The plea

negotiations are fully contained in the statement and in the
attached plea agreement or as supplemented on record before the
court.

There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would

support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the
pleas are entered and acceptance of the pleas would serve the public

interest•

<4fj^

4f><*4S

tNI'E JONES
Prosecuting Attorney

Attorney

ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the
defendant's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the statement
be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

V7

day of September, 1989.

OFPAT

ct Court Judge
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